We document substantial long-run post-issue underperformance by "rms making straight and convertible debt o!erings from 1975 to 1989. This long-run underperformance is more severe for smaller, younger, and NASDAQ-listed "rms, and for "rms issuing speculative grade debt. We also "nd strong evidence that the underperformance of issuers of both straight and convertible debt is limited to those issues that occur in periods with a high volume of issues. In contrast to earlier event studies that found insigni"cantly negative abnormal returns at the time of debt issue announcements and concluded that debt o!erings had no impact on shareholder wealth, our results suggest that debt o!erings, like equity o!erings, are signals that the "rm is overvalued. As with equity o!erings and repurchases, the market appears to underreact at the time of the debt o!ering announcement so that the full impact of the o!ering is only realized over a longer time horizon.
Introduction
Several studies document signi"cant long-run abnormal returns following stock issues and stock repurchases. Ritter (1991) and Loughran (1993) "nd that "rms making initial public o!erings signi"cantly underperform non-issuing "rms for up to "ve years after going public. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and A%eck-Graves (1995) "nd similar underperformance in the "ve years following seasoned equity o!erings. This underperformance exceeds 30% over a "ve-year period for both initial public o!erings and seasoned equity o!erings. Ikenberry et al. (1995) report signi"cant positive abnormal returns of 12% in the four-year period following stock repurchases.
An important aspect of these studies is that the long-term drift in stock returns is in the same direction as the initial reaction of the stock price at the time of the announcement, which suggests that the market, on average, underreacts at the time of an announcement. Daniel et al. (1998) present a theoretical model based on well-known psychological biases that is consistent with investors' underreaction to information events. Barberis et al. (1998) and Odean (1998) also present theoretical models of investor under-or overreaction to information. As a result, prior studies that focus on returns at the time of the announcement may be inadequate, and it may be necessary to examine performance over an extended period following an event to determine the full impact of that event.
In this study, we examine the long-term performance of stocks following both straight and convertible debt o!erings and "nd that prior studies of announcement period returns tell an incomplete story. Earlier studies such as Dann and Mikkelson (1984) , Eckbo (1986) , and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) "nd an insigni"cantly negative reaction to the announcement of straight debt o!erings and conclude that straight debt issuance, on average, has no impact on shareholder wealth. Unlike the announcement period literature, we conclude that "rms that are overvalued are likely to issue securities of any type, and that debt o!erings, like equity o!erings, are a signal that the "rm is overvalued. Using a carefully constructed sample of 392 straight debt issuers over the period from 1975 to 1989, we "nd that the median sample "rm underperforms a matched "rm of similar size and book-to-market ratio by almost 19% in the "ve years following the debt o!ering.
Firms issuing convertible debt also exhibit signi"cant stock price underperformance, and the magnitude of the response is quite similar to previously documented underperformance of equity issuers. In our sample of 400 convertible debt issuers, the median "rm underperforms its matched counterpart by almost 20% in the "ve years following the convertible debt o!ering, while the mean holding-period return for sample "rms is 37% less than the mean for the matched control "rms. Dann and Mikkelson (1984) "nd a signi"cant negative reaction at the announcement of convertible debt o!erings. Our results con"rm that convertible debt o!erings convey negative information to the market, but they suggest that the market underreacts at the time of the announcement. The similarity of the post-o!ering stock price response of convertible debt issuers to that of seasoned equity issuers supports the conclusion by Stein (1992) that convertible debt is used as a &backdoor' equity substitute.
Similar to previously documented evidence for equity o!erings, we "nd that the post-issue underperformance of straight debt issuers is concentrated among smaller, younger, and NASDAQ-listed "rms. For the largest straight debt issuers in our sample there is no underperformance. In addition, we "nd strong evidence that underperformance for both straight and convertible "rms is limited to issues that occur in periods with a high volume of issues. This is consistent with Loughran and Ritter's (1998) claim that "rm misvaluations that drive managerial choice events (e.g., equity issues) are likely to be correlated among "rms with similar characteristics, particularly smaller "rms, and to display time-and industry-clustering.
While our results suggest signi"cant underreaction to the announcement of both straight and convertible debt o!erings, an alternative explanation is that debt-issuing "rms are systematically less risky than their nonissuing counterparts. We attempt to control for risk di!erences by matching "rms on the basis of size and book-to-market ratio. It is possible, however, that size and book-tomarket ratio do not adequately capture the risk di!erences between issuers and matched non-issuers. Fama (1998) raises the issue of a bad model problem in his criticism of long-run event studies; he argues that the magnitude of abnormal returns in these studies is generally not robust to alternative speci"cations of expected returns or alternative subsets of the data.
We address Fama's critique in two ways. First, we measure long-run performance using averages of short-run abnormal returns rather than long-run buy-and-hold returns. We do this in two ways } the &rolling portfolio' approach recommended by Fama (1998) and the three-factor regression approach of . Using equally weighted portfolios, both of these methods yield results consistent with our buy-and-hold evidence of signi"cant underperformance following both straight and convertible debt o!erings. Second, in the context of buy-and-hold returns, we examine two alternative benchmarks of expected returns } individual matched "rms chosen on the basis of industry and "rm size, and the reference portfolio approach suggested by Lyon et al. (1998) . Again, we "nd evidence of signi"cant underperformance following both straight and convertible debt o!erings. Thus, while we are ultimately unable to disentangle these two non-competing explanations } market underreaction versus a bad model problem } we do present strong evidence that our results are robust across a number of reasonable speci"cations and methodologies.
A few other recent studies also report long-run performance following debt o!erings. Cheng (1995) and Jung et al. (1995) "nd positive, but statistically insigni"cant, average long-run returns. Jewell and Livingston (1997) likewise "nd no evidence of underperformance in the three years following straight debt o!erings for most classes of debt issues (the exception being 68 B-rated issues which have signi"cant underperformance). All three of these studies, however, use some form of cumulative abnormal return metric, and Lyon et al. (1998) show that such metrics can lead to biased test statistics. Lee and Loughran (1998) examine only convertible debt o!erings and "nd long-term underperformance similar to that documented for our convertible debt sample. Finally, Dichev and Piotroski (1997) document signi"cant underperformance in the "ve years following both straight and convertible debt o!erings. Their study di!ers from ours, however, in three important aspects. First, they include both public and private debt o!erings in their sample, but are unable to separate the performance of the two groups. Second, they provide evidence of underperformance only for the quintile of "rms with the largest debt o!erings (relative to assets), and not for all debt o!erings. Third, because of their inclusion of private debt, they are unable to ascertain the exact date of the o!ering. Despite these di!erences, the Dichev and Piotroski study provides an important complement to our results. Our results show underperformance following public debt o!erings. Because their sample is dominated by the much larger number of private debt placements relative to public o!erings, it suggests a similar conclusion following large private debt placements.
Data and research methods

Sample construction
The sample consists of straight and convertible debt o!erings during the period from 1975 to 1989, as reported in Investment Dealers+ Digest Directory of Corporate Financing. To be included, issues must meet the following criteria: (1) the company is listed on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) daily tape at the time of the issue; (2) the company is not a regulated utility or a "nancial institution; (3) shares traded for the company are ordinary common shares (we omit ADRs, SBIs, REITs, and closed-end funds); (4) the issue does not include warrants; (5) the issue does not include unusual securitization (e.g., no equipment trusts and mortgage-backed securities); and (6) the company has a non-negative book-to-market ratio available on COMPUSTAT for the "scal year-end prior to the debt o!ering. Applying these criteria results in a sample of 2229 o!erings, 1557 straight debt o!erings and 672 convertible debt o!erings. There are 1061 di!erent "rms represented in the combined sample; 641 of these make only one debt issue during the sample period, 192 "rms make two issues, 90 "rms make three issues, 41 "rms make four issues, 29 "rms make "ve issues, and 68 "rms make more than "ve issues (ranging from six to 24). Because test statistics are based on the assumption that the observations are Table 1 Distribution of debt o!erings by year
The sample includes all debt o!erings reported in Investment Dealers+ Digest Directory of Corporate Financing over the period 1975}1989 that meet the following criteria: (1) The company is listed on the CRSP daily NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ tape at the time of the issue; (2) the company is not a regulated utility or a "nancial institution; (3) the shares traded for the company are ordinary common shares (ADRs, SBIs, REITs, and closed-end funds are omitted); (4) the issue does not include warrants; and (5) the issue does not include unusual securitization (e.g., equipment trusts and mortgage-backed securities are omitted). Independent o!erings are those for which the "rm has not made any other debt issues during the "ve years following the sample o!ering 1975  112  100  60  12  9  1976  71  57  23  14  8  1977  60  50  24  10  4  1978  78  64  25  14  8  1979  73  54  16  19  12  1980  147  91  34  56  32  1981  111  60  11  51  24  1982  145  100  11  45  24  1983  152  90  24  62  29  1984  125  94  15  31  12  1985  241  165  32  76  44  1986  377  248  49  129  91  1987  239  145  25  94  64  1988  140  120  25  20  13  1989  158  119  18  39  26   Total  2229  1557  392  672  400 independent, we restrict our analysis to the subset of observations for which there is no overlap of the "ve-year post-o!ering windows for repeat issues. Using all observations and ignoring the statistical problems caused by overlapping returns, however, yields qualitatively identical results. The resulting sample consists of 792 independent issues, 392 straight debt o!erings and 400 convertible debt o!erings.
In Table 1 we present the distribution by year for our full sample of debt o!erings and for the restricted sample of independent o!erings. The number of o!erings #uctuates from year to year and is similar to the pattern of equity o!erings that Spiess and A%eck-Graves (1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) "nd during this time period. As with equity o!erings, there were more issues during the 1980s than during the last half of the 1970s, especially during 1986.
Eleven "rms did not have any potential matches meeting this constraint and so were matched with the closest "t available. The impact of the precision of the matches is discussed in Section 5.
Matched xrm selection
Our primary benchmark of aftermarket performance is a size-and-book-tomarket-matched sample of non-issuing "rms. These control "rms are also matched by trading system (NYSE/Amex or NASDAQ) and comprise "rms that have not publicly sold new shares of equity or made a public debt o!ering during the "ve years prior to the debt o!ering by the corresponding sample "rm. Barber and Lyon (1997) provide a complete discussion of the statistical issues involved in tests of long-run returns and conclude that the matched control "rm approach leads to unbiased test statistics.
The procedure we use to choose the control "rms is similar to that used by Spiess and A%eck-Graves (1995) . At each year end, all NYSE/Amex common stocks listed on the CRSP tape that have not publicly sold new equity or new debt during the previous "ve years (or since the time of listing if they have been listed for less than "ve years) are ranked by their market capitalization and their book-to-market ratio. For each NYSE/Amex-listed "rm in the sample, we select the "rst matched "rm from the set of potential matches such that the sum of the absolute percentage di!erence between the sizes (at December 31 of the year preceding the issue) and book-to-market ratios (at the end of the "scal year prior to the issue) of the issuing "rm and the matched "rm is minimized. We constrain the pool of potential matches so that matched "rms are not more than ten percent smaller than their sample "rms. If the "rst matched "rm is delisted or publicly sells new debt during the holding period, we substitute the next closest matched "rm at the close of trading on the date of the delisting or security sale. For the independent sample, 170 issues required two matched "rms, 31 required three, six required four, and two required "ve. Matched "rms are not allowed to be used more than once on the same trading day.
We use a similar procedure to choose matched "rms for the NASDAQ subset of the sample, except that the potential matches come from the set of NASDAQ-listed "rms on the CRSP tape that have not publicly sold debt or equity during the prior "ve years (or since the date of their listing if that is less than "ve years). For NASDAQ debt o!erings in 1975}1977, all "rms that were trading on December 14, 1972 (the "rst CRSP NASDAQ trading date) are considered as potential matches. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample and the set of "rst matched "rms. The mean straight debt issue of $93.1 million is almost twice as large as the mean convertible debt issue of $47.7 million. Both of these values are larger than the mean issue size of $36.6 million reported by Spiess and A%eck-Graves (1995) for primary seasoned equity o!erings during the same time period. In addition, "rms making straight debt o!erings are, on average, more than four times as large as those making convertible o!erings. The mean pre-issue market capitalization is $898 million for the straight debt issuers and $211 million for the convertible issuers; the comparable size of seasoned equity issuers is $332 million. The book-to-market ratio of the straight debt "rms is higher than that of the convertible debt "rms, and, while both o!er types follow periods of strong stock market performance, the convertible issues follow periods of especially strong performance. Speci"cally, the mean pre-o!er abnormal buy-and-hold return for the "ve-year period preceding the o!er date is 74% for the straight debt sample and 187% for the convertible debt sample. Table 2 also provides evidence regarding the similarity of the sample and matched "rms with respect to several characteristics. The mean di!erence in market capitalization between the straight debt sample "rms and their matched "rms is not statistically di!erent from zero. The mean di!erence in book-tomarket ratios for the two sets is also not statistically di!erent from zero. While not reported in this table, 69% of the straight debt "rms have matched "rm sizes within 5% of their corresponding sample "rm sizes, and 92% have size matches within 10%. Sixty percent of the sample "rms have book-to-market matches within 5% and 78% have book-to-market matches within 10%. Thus, we appear to have achieved fairly precise matches for our straight debt issuers with respect to both size and book-to-market ratio. In addition, the matched "rms do not di!er signi"cantly from the straight debt sample "rms with respect to "ve-year pre-o!er abnormal returns, six-month pre-o!er abnormal returns, or "rm age.
The matched "rms are not as similar to their sample "rms for the convertible debt issuers. The matched "rms are, on average, larger than their corresponding sample "rms. Given the negative relation between "rm size and expected return, however, this should bias against "nding abnormal underperformance on the part of our convertible debt issuers. The matched "rms are also older than the sample "rms, and they have higher book-to-market ratios and lower pre-o!er abnormal returns (on both the "ve-year and the six-month horizon). While the mismatch on book-to-market ratio and pre-o!er returns could bias in favor of "nding abnormal underperformance of our convertible debt sample, we present evidence in Section 5 that this is not the case.
Long-run returns measure
To measure the long-run performance of our debt o!ering "rms, we compute an aftermarket return from purchasing the shares of the issuing "rm at the closing price on the day of the o!ering. The aftermarket consists of the following 60 months, where months are de"ned as successive 21-trading-day periods. Several studies, particularly Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Barber and Lyon (1997) , show a potential bias induced by cumulating short-term abnormal Table 2 Sample descriptive statistics for independent debt o!erings in 1975}1989
Entries are mean values, with medians in parentheses. The samples consist of all debt o!erings reported in
Investment Dealers+ Digest Directory of
Corporate Financing over the period 1975}1989 that meet the selection criteria and an additional screen requiring that the issuing "rm has not made any other debt issues during the "ve years following the sample o!ering. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio Straight debt (n"392)
Convertible debt (n"400)
Sample "rms Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi"cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using paired t-tests for the di!erences in means and
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for the di!erences in medians.
Firm size is the CRSP year-end market capitalization for the calendar year prior to the o!ering.
Relative issue size is the issue size divided by "rm size, expressed as a percentage. Book-to-market ratio is book equity (Compustat annual data item 60) divided by the market value of equity (the product of items 25 and 199) at the "scal year end prior to the issue. Pre-o!er raw stock return is the "rm's holding-period return for the "ve years (or six months) prior to the debt o!ering, and pre-o!er abnormal stock return is the "rm's pre-o!er raw stock return minus the corresponding holding-period return for the CRSP value-weighted market index. For sample "rms that begin trading less than "ve years (or six months) before the issue, returns are calculated from the beginning of trading until the day before the o!ering.
Matched "rm returns are calculated over the same holding period as the corresponding sample "rms.
Firm age is the number of trading days from the initial CRSP date to the o!ering date.
returns over long periods. While Loughran and Ritter (1996) dispute the bias found by Conrad and Kaul (1993) , Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) present evidence that using cumulated abnormal returns over long periods does lead to biased statistical tests. Barber and Lyon (1997) also show, however, that the bias disappears if a single matched control "rm is used. We therefore measure long-run post-o!ering performance by computing holding-period returns for each debt-issuing "rm and its matched control "rm over a "ve-year period following the debt o!ering date. If the o!ering "rm is delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of its debt sale, the holding-period returns of that "rm and its matched "rm are truncated on the same day.
In Section 4, we demonstrate the robustness of our results using several alternative methods. There, we report results of long-run performance based on average monthly abnormal returns rather than buy-and-hold returns, based on three-factor regressions of calendar-time abnormal returns, and using alternative benchmarks of buy-and-hold returns. Table 3 reports the distributions of post-o!ering holding-period returns for sample "rms, matched "rms, and the paired di!erences. We also provide statistical results for di!erences in the mean and in the median holding-period return. Because we are interested in the abnormal returns associated with a debt o!ering by the typical "rm, we focus throughout the remainder of the paper on medians but we do report means when they lead to important di!erences in the conclusions drawn.
Post-o4ering performance
Post-owering performance of straight debt issuers
For the straight debt issuers, the median "ve-year holding-period return is 43.8%, while the median holding-period return for their size-and-book-tomarket-matched counterparts is 65.8%. The median di!erence in holdingperiod returns is !18.7% and is signi"cant at the 0.01 level using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. In addition, the di!erence between the holding-period return of the sample and the matched "rms is negative in 56% of the cases, and this fraction is statistically di!erent from 50% using a simple sign test. The mean holding-period return of 83.1% is not, however, statistically di!erent from the 97.4% mean return for the matched "rms. Our median results suggest that, for the individual "rm, issuing debt is likely to be followed by a period of relative underperformance. The mean result indicates that it may be di$cult for investors to earn abnormal pro"ts by trading on this underperformance.
Prior studies such as Dann and Mikkelson (1984) , Eckbo (1986) , and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) "nd an insigni"cantly negative price reaction to the Table 3 Distribution of "ve-year holding-period returns following independent debt o!erings in 1975}1989 Holding-period returns (HPRs) are calculated as [2G R (1#R GR )!1];100%, where R GR is the return on stock i on the tth day after the debt issue and ¹ G is the number of days from the o!ering date to the end of the holding period (t-statistics for the di!erences in means are presented in parentheses). For sample "rms that were delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of the o!ering, the HPR is calculated until the delisting date, and the corresponding matched "rm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched "rm is delisted or issues new debt, the next closest matched "rm's return is used. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio
Percentile
Straight debt %HPR (n"392) Convertible debt %HPR (n"400) Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi"cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using paired t-tests for the di!erences in means and Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for the di!erences in medians.
For the straight debt "rms, the p-value for the di!erence in medians is 0.0031, and for the convertible debt "rms this p-value is 0.0001.
announcement of straight debt o!erings. This led to the conclusion that, unlike equity and convertible debt issues, straight debt o!erings have no impact on shareholder wealth. In contrast, we "nd evidence of long-run underperformance following straight debt issues that is both economically and statistically signi"cant. Table 3 also reports the distribution of holding-period returns for the convertible debt issuers. Like the straight debt issuers, these "rms underperform their matched control "rms. The median convertible debt issuer has a "ve-year holding-period return of only 3.5%, compared with the median matched "rm return of 28.2%, and more than 57% of the sample "rms underperform their matched counterparts. The !19.8% median di!erence in holding-period returns is signi"cantly di!erent from zero at the 0.01 level, and the fraction of sample "rms that underperform their matched counterparts is signi"cantly di!erent from one half. For the convertible debt issuers, the average holdingperiod return is 23.2%, while the average holding-period return for their size-and-book-to-market-matched control "rms is 60.1%; the !37.0% mean di!erence in holding-period returns is also signi"cant at the 0.01 level but not statistically di!erent from the mean value for the straight debt sample. This mean underperformance is, however, comparable to the !42.4% "ve-year underperformance that Spiess and A%eck-Graves (1995) report for seasoned equity issuing "rms, which is consistent with interpreting convertible debt as an equity substitute.
Post-owering performance of convertible debt issuers
Alternative models for measuring long-term performance
Fama (1998) notes that using an inappropriate model to estimate abnormal returns can lead to signi"cant bias in long-term studies, and he argues that prior long-run event studies show evidence of the bad model problem because di!erent models of abnormal returns may produce di!erent results and reasonable changes in the model speci"cation even cause the abnormal performance to disappear in some cases. Although there is no way to avoid the potential of a bad model problem, we address this criticism by using four additional measures of long-run abnormal performance. The "rst two } the &rolling portfolio' approach suggested by Fama (1998) and the three-factor regression approach } are based on calendar-time averages of short-run abnormal returns. The second two } the individual matched "rm approach using alternative matching criteria and the benchmark portfolio approach of Lyon et al. (1998) } are based on event-time measures of long-run buy-and-hold returns. Fama (1998) notes that statistical issues such as extreme skewness of the computed returns (discussed in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1998) ) and possible correlation of returns across events (discussed in Brav (1997) ) make Because there are no independent convertible issues in the "rst three months of 1975 or the last two months of 1989, the initial estimation period for the convertibles is the sixty months from May 1975 to April 1980, and the test period is the 174 months from May 1980 to October 1994 it problematic to draw inferences from long-run buy-and-hold returns. As a result, Fama argues that measures of long-run performance should be based on averages of short-run abnormal returns.
Rolling portfolios of average monthly returns
In this section, we test for underperformance of our debt issuers using average monthly returns. For each calendar month, we calculate the abnormal return on each debt-o!ering "rm as the di!erence between the return of the sample "rm and the return of its size and book-to-market matched non-issuing "rm. The month t portfolio consists of all sample "rms that made a debt sale in the "ve years prior to month t. We form separate portfolios for the straight debt and convertible issuers. Because the selection criteria for the independent subset limit the sample to "rms that only have one debt sale during any given "ve-year window, no "rm is included more than once in portfolio t. The portfolio abnormal return for calendar month t is the average individual sample "rm abnormal return for the "rms included in portfolio t.
As Fama (1998) points out, the time-series variation of abnormal returns for this portfolio captures the impact of correlation of returns across event stocks that is missed by the model for expected returns. We allow for changes in the portfolio's risk and the heteroskedasticity of its returns due to changes through time in the portfolio's composition by using the approach of Ja!e (1974). First, we de"ne a measure of the variability of the performance of portfolio t as the computed standard deviation of the abnormal returns of portfolio t using data during the period from month (t!60) to month (t!1). Since we use "ve years of data to compute the estimated standard deviation of the portfolio abnormal returns, the remaining test period includes the portfolio returns from February 1980 through December 1994 (a total of 179 calendar months). The standardized portfolio abnormal return in month t is the portfolio abnormal return for month t divided by its standard deviation. This produces a time series of monthly standardized portfolio abnormal returns. The average standardized portfolio abnormal return for the entire test period is the simple average of all months that have at least one "rm in portfolio t.
Using this approach, we "nd signi"cant underperformance for both our straight and convertible debt samples. The average portfolio abnormal return for the straight debt sample during the February 1980 through December 1994 test period is !40 basis points per month with a t-statistic of !2.90, signi"cant at the 0.01 level. The test period average portfolio abnormal return for the convertible debt sample is !63 basis points per month with a t-statistic of !3.26. Thus, the results we present using buy-and-hold returns do not appear to be driven by statistical problems as suggested by Fama (1998) .
Fama}French three-factor regressions
A second approach that also controls for cross-sectional dependence is to construct calendar-time portfolios of event "rm returns and perform an intercept test based on the three-factor model. Table 4 presents the results of our three-factor regressions. We provide results for both equally and event-weighting the calendar periods and for both equally and value-weighting the return portfolios. Loughran and Ritter (1998) show that, when misvaluations are more extreme for smaller "rms and are clustered in time and within industries, tests that weight the calendar periods equally and tests that value-weight the return portfolios will have less power to detect economically signi"cant abnormal performance.
For the straight debt sample in Panel A, the abnormal return is negative and signi"cant (at the 0.05 level) when using equally weighted portfolios, regardless of whether we weight the calendar time periods. In both of these cases, the negative abnormal return is approximately 30 basis points per month, which compounds to over 16% in a "ve-year period. We "nd similar results for the equally weighted portfolios of convertible debt issuers. The abnormal return is a signi"cantly negative 31 basis points per month with equally weighted calendar periods and a signi"cantly negative 47 basis points per month when the calendar periods are weighted by the number of issues.
When we use value-weighted portfolios, however, the abnormal returns are not signi"cantly di!erent from zero for either the straight debt or the convertible debt sample. This is similar to the results of Loughran and Ritter (1998) , who show signi"cantly negative abnormal returns of 40 basis points per month following IPOs when using equally weighted portfolios but insigni"cant abnormal returns when using value-weighted portfolios. Our result is also consistent with the evidence in Brav et al. (1995) and Mitchell and Sta!ord (1998) , who show that the abnormal performance following equity o!erings is not evident when using value-weighted portfolios. To ensure that the subset of "rms that issued equity in the "ve years prior to the debt o!ering does not drive the results of Table 4 , we repeated the analysis excluding those "rms. The results are qualitatively identical and are available on request. Fama (1998) argues that anomalies that disappear with value weighting of the returns are evidence of a misspeci"ed model of expected returns. Loughran and Ritter (1998) counter that tests based on value-weighted returns simply have low power to detect economically signi"cant abnormal performance when that performance is expected to be more severe among smaller "rms. The choice of equally versus value-weighting the portfolio returns in event studies is ultimately an issue of perspective rather than one of methodological correctness. If the Table 4 Time-series regressions of monthly percentage returns of debt issuers using Fama and French's three-factor model
where R NR is the return on the portfolio of sample "rms in month t; R KR is the return on the value-weighted index of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks in month t; R DR is the 3-month T-bill yield in month t; SMB is the return on small "rms minus the return on large "rms in month t; and HML R is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t. The factor de"nitions are described in . The sample period is February 1975 to December 1994 (239 months), and sample "rm returns are included in a particular monthly portfolio if the "rm's debt o!ering date occurred within the last 60 months. The number of "rms in the portfolio ranges from 1 to 133 for the straight debt sample and from 2 to 207 for the convertible debt sample. Regressions (1) and (2) in each panel use equally weighted (EW) returns, and regressions (3) and (4) use value-weighted (VW) returns (with value measured as the sample "rms' year-end market capitalization in the year prior to the debt o!ering). Regressions (1) and (3) in each panel are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), and regressions (2) and (4) are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) with the weights based on the number of o!ering "rms in the monthly portfolio. Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics in parentheses. All t-statistics are calculated using White's method (White, 1980) relevant perspective is to measure the aggregate wealth e!ects experienced by investors, as argued by Fama, then value-weighting is appropriate. If, on the other hand, the relevant perspective is to measure the abnormal returns of a typical "rm undergoing a particular event, as argued by Loughran and Ritter, then equally weighting is appropriate.
Alternative benchmarks of buy-and-hold returns
For a "nal robustness check we use two alternative benchmarks of long-run buy-and-hold returns. First, we change the matching criteria to choose individual benchmark "rms matched on "rm size and industry. Second, we follow the procedure detailed in Lyon et al. (1998) to construct buy-and-hold reference portfolios as our benchmark of performance. For brevity, we do not report details, but these alternative benchmarks both produce inferences that are identical to those of the size-and-book-to-market-matched-"rm approach in Table 3 .
Cross-sectional patterns in the post-o4ering performance of debt-issuing 5rms
In the previous two sections we show signi"cant underperformance following debt o!erings for at least a substantial subset of "rms. While the methods used indicate varying levels of statistical signi"cance, it is interesting to note that all suggest underperformance of similar magnitude. Speci"cally, for straight debt issuers, the matched-"rm approach yields median (mean) underperformance of !19% (!14%) over the "ve-year post-issue period. The rolling portfolio approach "nds !40 basis points per month, which compounds to !21% over a "ve-year period, while the Fama}French three-factor regression model yields !16.5%. For the convertible debt o!erings, the mean "ve-year underperformance is!37%,!32%, and !25% using the matched-"rm, rolling portfolio, and Fama}French metrics respectively. We believe the consistency of these returns across di!erent methods provides compelling evidence of underperformance following debt o!erings.
In this section, we partition our sample of debt o!erings in several ways to determine the nature of the observed median long-run underperformance. We begin by examining subsets based on the closeness of the size and book-tomarket matches and based on whether our debt issuers also make equity o!erings during the years of the study. We also partition our sample based on the year of issue and the volume of issues o!ered in the same year, and on various "rm and issue characteristics, such as pre-o!ering stock price performance, issue size, "rm size, age, book-to-market ratio, and trading system. For the straight debt o!erings, we examine the impact of the bond rating. The underperformance we document for both the straight and convertible debt samples is quite robust. We provide more details of these results in the remainder of this section.
Post-owering performance for alternative samples
Because Table 2 reveals some signi"cant di!erences between the characteristics of our sample and matched "rms, particularly for the convertible debt Table 5 Long-run stock returns for independent debt o!erings in 1975}1989 using alternative sample selection criteria Holding-period returns (HPRs) are calculated as [2 G R (1#R GR )!1];100%, where R GR is the return on stock i on the tth day after the o!ering date and ¹ G is the number of days from the date of the o!ering to the end of the holding period. If the o!ering "rm is delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of the o!ering, the HPR is calculated until the delisting date, and the corresponding matched "rm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched "rm is delisted or issues new debt, the next closest matched "rm's return is used. The fraction underperforming is the fraction of the total sample for which the o!ering "rm's HPR is less than its matched "rm's HPR. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi"cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for the di!erences in medians and sign tests for the fractions underperforming.
&All independent issues' consists of all debt o!erings reported in Investment Dealers+ Digest Directory of Corporate Finance over the period 1975}1989 that meet the sample selection criteria and for which the issuing "rm has not made any other debt issues during the "ve years following the sample o!ering. The closest size match subset consists of "rms for which the market capitalization of the chosen matched "rm is within 5% of the sample "rm's market capitalization. The closest B/M match subset consists of "rms for which the book-to-market ratio of the chosen matched "rm is within 5% of the sample "rm's book-to-market ratio. The no equity subset consists of independent issues by "rms that have not sold new seasoned equity during the "ve years prior to the sample debt o!erings. sample, the observed underperformance of debt issuers may be the result of selecting matched "rms that are not su$ciently similar to their sample "rms. To examine this possibility, we partition the data based on whether the closeness of the match meets more stringent requirements. In Table 5 , we report posto!ering performance for the subsets of "rms that have size and book-to-market ratio matches within 5%. For comparison, we repeat the full sample results from Table 3 . For both straight and convertible debt issuers, the subset of closely matched "rms exhibits more severe underperformance than the full independent sample, suggesting that the underperformance of the full sample is not driven by a subset of poorly matched "rms.
Previous studies show underperformance following equity o!erings, so we also check whether the underperformance we observe is limited to those "rms that also made equity o!erings near the time of the sample debt o!ering. We create subsets of the data by imposing the additional restriction that the "rm has not sold new seasoned equity during the "ve years prior to its debt issue. This restriction has its greatest impact on the convertible debt sample, which contains three times as many recent equity issuers as the straight debt sample. In Table 5 , we report post-o!ering performance for the debt-issuing "rms that had not recently issued equity. For this subset, the median di!erence in holdingperiod return between the debt issuers and their matched "rms is !15.3% for the straight debt "rms and !12.3% for the convertible debt "rms. Both of these median di!erences are signi"cant at the 0.05 level. As a result, we conclude that the underperformance we observe cannot be explained solely by the existence of equity-issuing "rms in our original sample. There is evidence, however, that underperformance is more severe for those sample "rms that were also equity issuers. For both straight and convertible debt "rms, the median di!erence in holding-period return for the no-equity subset is signi"cantly less negative at the 0.10 level.
Post-owering performance categorized by pre-owering stock return
As reported in Table 2 , our sample debt issues do follow a period of signi"cant stock price appreciation for the "rm. The mean pre-o!er abnormal holdingperiod return for the "ve years prior to the o!ering is 74% for the straight debt sample and 187% for the convertible debt sample. It is, therefore, reasonable to question whether the observed post-o!ering underperformance is merely due to long-term mean reversion, as in De Bondt and Thaler (1985,1987) . Table 6 presents long-run post-o!ering stock returns for the debt issuers categorized by their pre-o!ering performance. Panel A contains results for straight debt issuers, and panel B contains results for convertible debt issuers. There is an inverse U-shaped pattern in the performance of straight debt issuers. Straight debt issuers signi"cantly underperform their matched "rms in three of the pre-o!ering stock return quintiles, with the worst median underperformance in the "rst and "fth quintiles. A Wilcoxon multiple-sample signed-ranks test shows signi"cant di!erences in the median performance across quintiles. Pairwise multiple comparisons show that the median performance of "rms in quintiles 1 and 5 is signi"cantly more negative (at the 0.05 level) than that of "rms in quintiles 2 and 3. While the "rms in quintile 4 also have more negative Table 6 Long-run stock returns categorized by pre-o!ering stock return performance for independent debt o!erings in 1975}1989 Holding-period returns (HPRs) are calculated as [2 G R (1#R GR )!1];100%, where R GR is the return on stock i on the tth day after the o!ering date and ¹ G is the number of days from the date of the o!ering to the end of the holding period. For issuing "rms that were delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of the o!ering, the HPR is calculated until the delisting date, and the corresponding matched "rm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched "rm is delisted or issues new debt, the next closest matched "rm's return is used. The fraction underperforming is the fraction of the total sample for which the o!ering "rm's HPR is less than its matched "rm's HPR. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi"cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for the di!erences in medians and sign tests for the fractions underperforming. PreAR is the "rm's holding-period return for the "ve years (1260 trading days) prior to the debt o!ering minus the corresponding holding-period return for the CRSP value-weighted market index. For "rms that begin trading less than "ve years prior to the o!ering, the return is calculated from the beginning of trading until the day before the o!ering.
median performance than "rms in quintiles 2 and 3, the di!erence is only signi"cant with respect to quintile 3. The convertible debt issuers also show signi"cant underperformance in three of the pre-o!ering return quintiles. While the pattern of underperformance is opposite to that displayed by straight debt issuers, there are no signi"cant di!erences across quintiles. In both cases, however, post-issue performance is essentially the same for the &losers' in quintile 1 as for the &winners' in quintile 5. This suggests that overreaction of the type shown by De Bondt and Thaler (1985,1987) cannot fully explain the post-o!ering underperformance of our debt issuers.
Post-owering performance categorized by year of owering and issue volume
To determine whether the average underperformance following debt o!erings varies across time periods, we partition the sample into two groups: issues made during the 1975 to 1982 period and issues made during the 1983 to 1989 period. Panel A of Table 7 presents results for the straight debt o!erings. The median di!erence in holding-period return between sample and matched "rms is signi"-cantly negative only in the later period.
While it appears from this result that underperformance is limited to a particular period, it is important to recall that the issue environment di!ers substantially between these two periods. In particular, the later period includes the hot issue market of the mid-1980s. Loughran and Ritter (1998) argue that events such as security issues that may be motivated by behavioral timing on the part of managers should logically be clustered in time and that high-volume periods should be correlated with greater misvaluations. Table 1 clearly demonstrates that our sample debt o!erings are clustered in time. To check whether the underperformance is more severe for high-volume periods, as opposed simply to issues in di!erent time horizons, we also segment the sample into issues in highand low-volume periods. We de"ne high-volume issues as those that occur during a year in which the total number of issues is at least the median number of issues per year for the entire 1975 to 1989 period. Using this de"nition, 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1985 through 1989 are the high-volume years. The median di!erence in holding-period return for high-volume straight debt issues is !25.6%, which is signi"cant at the 0.01 level. In contrast, the median di!erence in holding-period return for straight debt issues in low-volume years is !7.9%, which is not statistically di!erent from zero.
The convertible debt results in Panel B provide further support for interpreting this evidence as an issue-volume correlation rather than a time-period anomaly. Convertible debt issuers signi"cantly underperform their matched "rms in both time periods. In fact, the magnitude of the underperformance is qualitatively more severe in the earlier period (the di!erence across the two subperiods is not statistically signi"cant). This suggests that, at least for convertible issuers, underperformance is not limited to a particular time period. When we segment the convertible sample by issue volume, however, underperformance is limited to the high-volume issues, just as it was for the straight debt issuers. In particular, the median di!erence in holding-period return for high-volume convertible issues is !20.9%, which is signi"cant at the 0.01 level, while the median di!erence in holding-period return for convertible issues in low-volume years is !4.1%, which is not statistically di!erent from zero. Table 7 Long-run stock returns categorized by year of issue and issue volume for independent debt o!erings in 1975}1989
Holding-period returns (HPRs) are calculated as [2 G R (1#R GR )!1];100%, where R GR is the return on stock i on the tth day after the o!ering date and ¹ G is the number of days from the date of the o!ering to the end of the holding period. For issuing "rms that were delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of the o!ering, the HPR is calculated until the delisting date, and the corresponding matched "rm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched "rm is delisted or issues new debt, the next closest matched "rm's return is used. The fraction underperforming is the fraction of the total sample for which the o!ering "rm's HPR is less than its matched "rm's HPR. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio One, two, and three asterisks indicate signi"cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for the di!erences in medians and sign tests for the fractions underperforming. Low-volume issues are those that occur during a year in which the total number of issues is less than the median number of issues per year for the entire period from 1975 to 1989. High-volume issues are those that occur during a year in which the total number of issues is at least the median number of issues per year for the entire period from 1975 to 1989. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and A%eck-Graves (1995) show that underperformance following equity issues is more severe for smaller, younger, and NASDAQ-listed "rms. To determine whether the underperformance following debt o!erings is similarly attributable to a particular subset of "rms, we partition our sample into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratio, "rm size, "rm age, or issue size. We also partition according to the trading system of the Table 8 Long-run stock returns categorized by "rm and o!er characteristics for 392 independent straight debt o!erings in 1975}1989
Post-owering performance categorized by xrm and owering characteristics
Holding-period returns (HPRs) are calculated as [2 G R (1#R GR )!1];100%, where R GR is the return on stock i on the tth day after the o!ering date and ¹ G is the number of days from the date of the o!ering to the end of the holding period. For issuing "rms that were delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of the o!ering, the HPR is calculated until the delisting date, and the corresponding matched "rm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched "rm is delisted or issues new debt, the next closest matched "rm's return is used. The fraction underperforming is the fraction of the total sample for which the o!ering "rm's HPR is less than its matched "rm's HPR. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio sample "rm and, for the straight debt o!erings, according to Moody's bond rating of the issue. We present the results in Table 8 for the straight debt o!erings and in Table 9 for the convertible debt o!erings. The comparison in Panels A through E of Table 8 reveals results very similar to the earlier equity studies. Speci"cally, for straight debt issues, while underperformance is evident in most sub-groups, it is more severe for smaller, younger, and NASDAQ-traded stocks and in those issues that are larger relative to the market capitalization of the company. The performance is statistically di!erent across subsets in the case of the "rm size partition, with no underperformance in the largest "rm size quintile. In Panel F of Table 8 , we report results for the straight debt issuers categorized by Moody's bond rating for the issue. We could not "nd a bond rating for 33 of the 392 independent issues. Of the issues that were rated, 58% are investment grade (BBB or above) and 42% are speculative grade (below BBB). A Wilcoxon multiple-sample signed-ranks tests shows that di!erences in performance across the bond rating categories are signi"cant at the 0.05 level. While the median di!erence in holding-period return is negative in every category, it is not signi"cantly negative for the investment grade issues. In contrast, "rms issuing speculative grade debt experience signi"cant median underperformance of !36.4% relative to their matched "rms.
The underperformance of the convertible debt "rms, reported in Table 9 , is even more robust with respect to the characteristics examined. Consistent with the previously documented evidence for seasoned equity o!erings, panels A, B, and C report underperformance in most "rm size, "rm age, and book-to-market ratio quintiles, with signi"cant underperformance for four of the quintiles in Table 9 Long-run stock returns categorized by "rm characteristics for 400 independent convertible debt o!erings in 1975}1989
Holding-period returns (HPRs) are calculated as [2 G R (1#R GR )!1];100%, where R GR is the return on stock i on the tth day after the o!ering date and ¹ G is the number of days from the date of the o!ering to the end of the holding period. For issuing "rms that delisted before the "ve-year anniversary of the o!ering, the HPR is calculated until the delisting date, and the corresponding matched "rm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched "rm is delisted or issues new debt, the next closest matched "rm's return is used. The fraction underperforming is the fraction of the total sample for which the o!ering "rm's HPR is less than its matched "rm's HPR. Matched "rms are chosen based on size and book-to-market ratio Table 9 , we segment the sample based on the "rm's trading system at the time of the o!ering. Unlike the straight debt sample, which is predominantly larger exchange-listed "rms, NASDAQ-listed "rms comprise 54% of the convertible debt sample. Our results show that "rms on both trading systems experience signi"cant underperformance. While there is some evidence that underperformance is more marked for the exchange-listed sub-sample, the median di!erence values are not statistically di!erent across these two categories.
Summary and conclusions
We show that underperformance following initial and seasoned equity o!erings is not unique to stock o!erings but extends to other classes of securities as well. Unlike earlier studies that found little evidence of long-term underperformance following debt sales, we use a return metric that Lyon et al. (1998) show leads to well-speci"ed test statistics in long-term performance studies. We document economically and statistically signi"cant long-run stock price underperformance following both straight and convertible debt o!erings. We also provide several robustness checks to show that the underperformance of equally weighted portfolios is not sensitive to the method used to measure abnormal returns.
When we examine cross-sectional di!erences in long-run abnormal returns, we "nd patterns for the straight debt sample that are quite similar to previously documented patterns among equity issuers. For our straight debt issuers, the underperformance is more severe among the smaller, younger, and NASDAQlisted "rms and among issues that are not investment grade. There is no evidence of underperformance for the largest straight debt issuers in our sample. While the underperformance of the convertible debt issuers does not show the same patterns, our sample population of convertible debt issuers consists of "rms that are smaller, younger, and more likely to be NASDAQ-listed than our straight debt issuers. In addition, our analysis of various subperiods provides strong evidence that the underperformance is limited to o!erings that occur in periods with high issue volume. All of this evidence is consistent with interpreting debt o!erings as a signal that the "rm is overvalued. We, therefore, expect the abnormal performance to be concentrated among "rms that share characteristics that make them more likely to be misvalued, and we expect more extreme misvaluations in high-volume periods. The fact that debt issues result in valuation e!ects that are so similar to the previously documented e!ect for equity o!erings is consistent with capital structure models, such as Miller and Rock (1985) , that suggest that all security issues should result in negative stock price e!ects.
Our evidence of signi"cant underperformance following debt o!erings adds to the literature examining long-run abnormal returns following important information events. While long-run underperformance following debt o!erings is also consistent with the use of an inappropriate asset pricing model that results in a mismeasurement of the relative risk of the sample and the benchmark, the magnitude and robustness of our results suggest that risk di!erences cannot provide a complete explanation. Consequently, we believe that our results are more consistent with market underreaction to negative information conveyed at the time of the issue announcement.
It is important to note that we use the term &underreaction' to describe managerial choice events in which the post-event abnormal return is of the same sign as the announcement period abnormal return. This continuation of positive or negative abnormal performance from the announcement period into the post-event period suggests that market participants underreact to the information contained in the announcement. Our evidence of negative abnormal performance following debt issues, coupled with prior evidence of negative stock price reactions to announcements of debt issues, is consistent with interpreting a debt o!ering as an event that is subject to market underreaction. In fact, the majority of long-run return studies can be classi"ed as market underreactions. Of the numerous managerial choice events surveyed by Fama (1998) , only two (the post-listing phenomenon of Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) and the proxy contest of Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) ) would not be classi-"ed as market underreactions using our de"nition. Most managerial choice events } including equity issues, acquisitions, divestitures, stock splits, share repurchases, dividend initiations and dividend omissions } show evidence of market underreaction to the information conveyed by the event announcement.
An alternative, but not mutually exclusive, interpretation of our results follows Fama (1998) , who might describe the underperformance following our debt o!erings as &overreaction' since negative announcement and post-issue performance follows a period of abnormally positive performance before the issue announcement. This distinction has important implications for interpreting long-run performance anomalies and their relation to market e$ciency. Fama (1998) argues that underreactions and overreactions are mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses to market e$ciency. Using an extensive survey of long-run anomaly studies, he argues that overreactions occur with the same approximate frequency as underreactions, leading him to conclude that there is no evidence of a systematic deviation from market e$ciency. This characterization of underreactions and overreactions as mutually exclusive phenomena may, however, be misleading. In the existing literature, these two terms are generally not used as opposites; instead, they describe post-event performance relative to two di!erent comparison periods. Underreactions generally refer to comparisons to the "rm's announcement period stock price response, while overreactions generally refer to comparisons to the "rm's pre-announcement period performance.
Similar to previous evidence for equity-o!ering "rms, the stock price of "rms making debt o!erings both underreacts to the news of the o!ering announcement and overreacts to the pre-announcement returns. We show, however, that the negative performance following debt o!erings is relatively insensitive to the "rm's long-run performance prior to the issue, so our results cannot be fully explained by overreaction to pre-event returns. We therefore believe that our results are most appropriately described as an example of market underreaction and, as such, they provide an important addition to this literature.
